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I. INTRODUCTION
This article summarizes and analyzes cases decided by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and Texas courts of ap-
peals during the Survey period, spanning from December 1, 2018 to
November 30, 2019.
Section II covers confessions caselaw, which did not experience any
substantial changes. Section III covers search and seizure caselaw, where
we see important developments. Subjects covered include involuntary
confession, reasonable expectations of privacy, probable cause, exigent
circumstances, implied consent, and the private-party search doctrine.
II. CONFESSIONS
The Fifth Amendment is the bedrock of the law governing confes-
sions.1 In Texas we also have added protections found in Articles 38.21
and 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.2 The Supreme Court
* Leonel V. Mata is the Briefing Attorney for Judge Michael E. Keasler. He gradu-
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 38.21, 38.22.
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of the United States has interpreted the Fifth Amendment to prevent the
admissibility of statements made by suspects during a custodial interroga-
tion by law enforcement unless certain requirements are met.3 Those re-
quirements are that suspects being held and interrogated are (1) given
warnings regarding their rights,4 and (2) they understand and waive those
rights voluntarily.5 In Miranda v. Arizona, the necessary warnings were
identified as: (1) the right to remain silent, and that any statement made
may be used as evidence against them in court; (2) that they have the
right to a lawyer and to have that lawyer present during any interroga-
tion; and (3) that if they cannot afford to hire a lawyer then they have the
right to have a lawyer appointed concerning that matter.6 This protection
has been codified in Texas under Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Crim-
inal Procedure.7 Texas also requires that any statement used in evidence
against a suspect in custody must be given “freely and voluntarily made
without compulsion or persuasion.”8
There have been no significant developments in confession caselaw by
the U.S. Supreme Court or the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals during
the Survey period. Therefore, select cases from the Texas courts of ap-
peals during the Survey period will be reviewed. Frequently, the credibil-
ity of witnesses is important in determining whether a confession was
legally obtained, and reviewing courts apply a deferential standard of re-
view to that determination. The selected cases demonstrate the difficulty
appellants can face on appeal under that standard.
A. TWO-STEP INTERROGATION
In Foster v. State, Leslie Ray Foster sought to suppress custodial state-
ments he made to a police officer after being arrested and statements he
made to a detective at the police station.9 Only the detective warned Fos-
ter of his Miranda rights. Foster argued that law enforcement had circum-
vented his Miranda rights by applying a two-step technique known as
“question first, warn later.”10 The State conceded that the pre-Miranda
statements were inadmissible, and the trial judge denied Foster’s motion
to suppress the post-Miranda statements.11
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals analyzed whether an imper-
missible two-step interrogation occurred. The court found that the thresh-
old question to decide was whether the State deliberately used a
“question first, warn later” strategy.12 If the strategy was deliberate, then
3. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
4. See id. at 471.
5. Id. at 475.
6. See id. at 444.
7. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22.
8. Id. art. 38.21.
9. Foster v. State, 579 S.W.3d 606, 609–10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no
pet.).
10. Id. at 609.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 612.
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post-Miranda statements related to the pre-Miranda statements must be
suppressed unless curative measures were taken before the post-Miranda
statements were made.13 If the strategy was not deliberate, “then the
post-Miranda statements may be admitted if [Foster] voluntarily waived
his Miranda rights.”14
In order to determine deliberateness, the court focused on the subjec-
tive intent of the arresting officer who questioned Foster before Foster
was advised of his Miranda rights.15 Since such a determination turns on
the credibility of the officer, and the trial judge is the fact finder, the
court of appeals applied a highly deferential standard in reviewing the
trial judge’s findings.16 The court found that the officer did engage in an
interrogation, which violated Miranda, and that those answers were inad-
missible.17 However, the fact that Foster initiated the questioning and
that the questioning was conversational in nature went against a finding
that a two-step strategy was deliberately used.18 Foster’s argument that
the officer and detective spoke to each other after the arrest and prior to
Foster’s transport, and that they interrogated Foster close in time, was not
enough to prove that a two-step strategy was deliberately used.19 It was
also not enough that the officer knew that Foster was under arrest and
interrogated him without Miranda warnings.20 Because a court of appeals
affords almost total deference to a trial judge’s determination that is sup-
ported by the record, the trial judge’s implied finding of a lack of deliber-
ateness by the officer was upheld.21
The court then turned to the issue of voluntariness. The trial judge
found that Foster understood and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
when speaking to the detective.22 The court reviewed this finding for an
abuse of discretion.23 The court of appeals considered:
• the detective’s demeanor;
• that Foster’s handcuffs were removed;
• that Foster responded that he understood his Miranda rights; and
• that Foster was cooperative.24
The court rejected the argument that the “statements to the detective
were involuntary because they were a continuation of his pre-Miranda
statements to the officer.”25 The factors in rejecting it were the amount of
13. Id. (citing Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31, 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)).
14. Id. at 613.
15. Id. at 612–13 (citing Carter, 309 S.W.3d at 39).




20. Id. at 613–14.
21. Id. at 614.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31, 41–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)).
24. Id. at 614.
25. Id.
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time between interrogations, whether there was a change in place of the
interrogations, and whether the interrogators changed.26 The court found
that one to two hours between interrogations, different locations, and dif-
ferent interrogators supported the trial judge’s finding that it was not a
continuation of the pre-Miranda interrogation.27 Again, the court of ap-
peals found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that
Foster voluntarily waived his Miranda rights when speaking to the detec-
tive.28 The trial judge’s ruling was affirmed.29
B. INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
In Miranda v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals reviewed two is-
sues: (1) whether Amado R. Miranda involuntarily confessed to the po-
lice, and (2) whether Miranda received effective assistance of counsel.30
Only issue one is relevant to this discussion. Issue one implicated Mi-
randa v. Arizona,31 the Texas confession statute,32 and the right to be free
from police coercion.33 As stated previously, Miranda v. Arizona protects
one’s Fifth Amendment rights during custodial interrogation by requiring
that certain warnings be given.34 Under Article 38.21, any statement
given by an individual must have been given freely and voluntarily.35
Lastly, “the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that an accused’s statement be voluntary and not the product of police
coercion.”36
Miranda argued that the totality of the circumstances proved that his
confession was involuntary. The trial judge denied Miranda’s motion to
suppress. A court of appeals reviews a motion to suppress ruling for an
abuse of discretion.37 The record noted that Miranda testified that he vol-
untarily went to the police station, believing he was going to speak to the
police about payment of property taxes. He testified that the detective he
spoke to only spoke in English, and that “a certain amount of time” or “a
lot of time” went by before someone who spoke imperfect Spanish came
in to assist with communication between him and the detective.38 Mi-




30. Miranda v. State, No. 07-17-00327-CR, No. 07-17-00328-CR, 2019 WL 5280980, at
*1, *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 17, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
31. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
32. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.21.
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
34. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.
35. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.21.
36. Lopez v. State, No. 13-13-00307-CR, 2015 WL 5602278, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg June 25, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
37. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
38. Miranda v. State, No. 07-17-00327-CR, No. 07-17-00328-CR, 2019 WL 5280980, at
*1, *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 17, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
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randa admitted that the police never said, “I promise you that I’m going
to do this,” but that, through their statements, they suggested that things
would be okay if he told them what they wanted to hear.39 In fact, Mi-
randa testified that the police said they could not make promises about
how Miranda’s situation would be handled.40 Miranda was not restrained
and was told at the beginning of the interview that he was free to leave.41
When the translator arrived, the police communicated that Miranda did
not have to talk to them and that he could leave at any time.42 Miranda
argued that, during the interrogation, he maintained his innocence for a
long time before making some admissions.43
The court of appeals found that the trial judge, based on the record,
was within his discretion to conclude that, while Miranda may have been
confused, confusion is not equivalent to coercion.44 It also noted that an
ill-advised statement is not the same as an involuntary statement.45 It is
not enough, under this standard of review, for an appellant to show that
there could be a different interpretation of the record. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial judge’s ruling.46
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Both the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution pro-
vide individuals with protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures.47 Intrinsic to those protections is a reasonable expectation of
privacy recognized by the courts.48 Recently, this understanding has been
applied to modern technologies such as cell phones.49 While our constitu-
tions grant substantial protection for individuals, that protection is not
unlimited. Among the various limits or exceptions that will be reviewed
are when probable cause exists, when there are exigent circumstances,
and when consent is given.
A. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
The courts have looked to the word “reasonable” to guide them in de-
termining the limits on what is protected under the Constitution.50 Not
long before this Survey period, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Carpen-






44. Id. at *5.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
48. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–97, 401 (2014); Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
50. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
51. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206.
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sion in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In his opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts highlighted “the seismic shifts in digital technology that made
possible the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone
else’s, not for a short period but for years and years.”52 In a narrow deci-
sion, the Court held that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
certain amounts of historical cell-site location information (CSLI) data.53
The Court rejected the third-party doctrine as an exception to the war-
rant requirement in this type of situation.54 Since then, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has been presented with two opportunities to evaluate
how this ruling applies.
First, in Sims v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was
presented with a situation where law enforcement used real-time location
information to track Christian Vernon Sims’s cell phone without a war-
rant.55 The police used that information to find and arrest Sims.56 Sims
filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the police violated the United
States Constitution,57 the Texas Constitution,58 the Stored Communica-
tions Act (SCA),59 and Articles 18.2160 and 38.23 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.61 The trial judge denied the motion and the court of
appeals affirmed.
Sims argued that the real-time location data must be suppressed under
Article 38.23(a) because it was obtained in violation of the SCA and Arti-
cle 18.21.62 The SCA and Article 18.21 contain exclusivity provisions that
state that without a federal constitutional violation (the SCA) or a federal
or state constitutional violation (Article 18.21), the only remedies availa-
ble are those provided by the statutes.63 The court rejected Sims’s argu-
ment that the provisions were ambiguous and held that the language of
the statutes was “plain and that effectuating that language does not lead
to absurd results.”64 Applying the “general versus the specific” canon of
statutory construction, the court was able to harmonize the SCA and Ar-
ticle 18.21 with Article 38.23.65 This canon states that if there is a conflict
between a general provision and a special provision then the specific pro-
52. Id. at 2219.
53. Id. at 2217.
54. Id. at 2220.
55. Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
2749 (2019).
56. Id. at 637.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
58. TEX. CONST. art I, § 9.
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2703 (2012).
60. Act. of Aug. 26, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S. Ch. 587, § 5, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2216
(repealed 2019).
61. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 38.23(a).
62. Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
2749 (2019).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2012); Act. of Aug. 26, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S. Ch. 587, § 5, 1985
Tex. Gen. Laws 2216 (repealed 2019).
64. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 641.
65. See id.; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.026(a); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 183 (2012).
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vision prevails only to the extent that they overlap.66 Thus, the SCA and
Article 18.21 exclusivity provisions control in this situation over Article
38.23, a general statutory suppression remedy.67
Turning to the Fourth Amendment claim, to prevail, Sims needed to
show (1) “a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) that the subjective
expectation of privacy is one that society recognizes, or is prepared to
recognize, as reasonable.”68 When evaluating whether Sims’s allegations
met this standard, the court applied Carpenter.69 Acknowledging that
Carpenter dealt specifically with historical CSLI, the court decided that
the analysis for real-time CSLI records is not meaningfully different from
Carpenter.70 In fact, it noted that, “unlike historical CSLI . . . real-time
CSLI records are generated solely at the behest of law enforcement.”71
Also, the expectation-of-privacy analysis is the same as in Carpenter, be-
cause it “turns on the significance of the invasion of a protected privacy
interest.”72 As a result, the court found that the third-party doctrine73
and the public-thoroughfare rule74 were not valid exceptions here.75 In-
stead, for a government action to be considered a “search” or “seizure”
one must evaluate whether enough information was searched or seized
that it violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.76
The court refused to announce a bright-line rule in determining how
this type of situation should be decided.77 Instead, it called for a case-by-
case determination.78 The court then relied on the fact that the police
used less than three hours of real-time CSLI data that was gathered by
pinging Sims’s cell phone less than five times.79 It recognized that the
U.S. Supreme Court has stated that longer-term surveillance might in-
fringe on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy if the records re-
veal the “privacies of [his] life,” but this was not that scenario.80 Since no
violation of the United States or Texas constitutions occurred, suppres-
sion was not appropriate under any of Sims’s theories. Notably, the court
expanded the application of the Fourth Amendment and has provided
guidance for courts and practitioners to apply.
In State v. Martinez, Juan Martinez, Jr. was indicted for intoxication
manslaughter, and he filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood
66. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.026(a); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 65, at 183.
67. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 642.
68. Id. at 643 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 645.
71. Id. at 645 n.15.
72. Id.
73. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
74. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
75. Sims, 569 S.W.3d at 645.
76. Id. at 645–46.
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draw done to him at a hospital for medical purposes.81 The trial judge
granted the motion, and the Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals
affirmed. Martinez was involved in a traffic accident and transported to a
nearby hospital. Martinez was not under arrest at that time and the hospi-
tal began “trauma procedures” that involved taking blood from him.82
Martinez became aware of the blood draw and told the hospital staff he
could not afford any tests and needed to leave. Trooper Quiroga arrived
at the hospital but did not meet with Martinez. The hospital staff told
Quiroga that they had Martinez’s blood. Quiroga told the staff not to
destroy the blood and obtained a Grand Jury Subpoena. The hospital re-
leased the blood to the police once they received the subpoena. The
blood was sent by law enforcement to the Department of Public Safety
lab in Austin, Texas for testing.
Martinez argued that his blood was obtained, in part, in violation of the
United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution.83 The trial judge
made findings of historical fact that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
deferred to.84 The State argued that the lower courts did not follow the
court’s previous holdings in State v. Hardy85 and State v. Huse.86 The
State also argued that State v. Comeaux was improperly relied on.87 The
court reviewed Comeaux, finding that it addressed a similar question that
was presented in Martinez; however, Comeaux resulted in only a plurality
opinion finding that Comeaux’s Fourth Amendment rights were vio-
lated.88 In Hardy, blood was drawn by hospital staff and tested by the
hospital to determine blood alcohol content (BAC).89 The court distin-
guished Hardy from Comeaux, stating that Comeaux required a warrant
to obtain and test the blood, whereas Hardy held that the State obtaining
the hospital’s test results of blood was not protected by the Fourth
Amendment in that narrow scenario.90 Huse was granted by the court to
review Hardy in light of the enactment of the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act.91 The holding in Hardy was reaf-
firmed in Huse.92
The State argued that Martinez had no subjective expectation of pri-
vacy and that Martinez lost any potential expectation of privacy when he
left the hospital, thus abandoning and surrendering the blood that was
drawn.93 The court reiterated that the test for determining abandonment
“does not begin with a presumption of abandonment that must be rebut-
81. State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 281–82.
84. Id. at 282.
85. 963 S.W.2d 516, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
86. 491 S.W.3d 833, 835–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
87. 818 S.W.2d 46, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
88. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 284 (citing Comeaux, 818 S.W.2d at 48–49, 53).
89. Id. (citing Hardy, 963 S.W.2d at 518).
90. Id. (citing Hardy, 963 S.W.2d at 526–27).
91. Huse, 491 S.W.3d at 835.
92. Id. at 841.
93. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 285–86.
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ted” by Martinez.94 The State needed to prove an affirmative intent by
Martinez to abandon his blood.95 The court considered that Martinez told
hospital staff that he did not want any tests to be performed because he
could not afford them.96 This showed that he did not intend to surrender
all decision-making authority over the blood.97 The court also considered
the location of where the blood was left.98 The court found that by leav-
ing it in possession of the hospital, in combination with testimony stating
it would not be turned over without a court order, indicated that this
location was distinct from leaving blood in a public place where anybody
can access it.99 Therefore, the blood was not considered to be
abandoned.100
Turning to whether Martinez’s expectation of privacy was reasonable,
the court considered whether the third-party doctrine was applicable.101
The third-party doctrine ordinarily involves a voluntary relinquishment of
information to a third party.102 Here, the court found a lack of voluntari-
ness. Martinez was taken to the hospital by ambulance after a traffic acci-
dent.103 The hospital staff noted that Martinez gave consent to be treated
only concerning his hand and was uncooperative with all other proce-
dures attempted.104 The issue of implied consent was raised through hos-
pital staff testimony stating that they had no paperwork showing a refusal
of a blood draw.105 Addressing this point, Martinez argued that his inco-
herent state at the time prevented any sort of implied consent. The court
took note of another hospital staffer’s records, which indicated that Mar-
tinez was in an altered mental state.106 The court ultimately found a lack
of voluntariness that rendered the third-party doctrine inapplicable.107
As to whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists regarding
one’s own blood, the court reviewed U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
that found that the collection and analysis of biological samples are
Fourth Amendment searches.108 As to collection, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that blood collection implicates a privacy interest due to
the intrusive nature of the extraction which requires a surgical intrusion
into the body.109 As to analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
ability to uncover various private medical facts about someone implicates
94. Id. at 286.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 282.
97. Id. at 286.
98. Id. at 287 (quoting United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 666–67 (6th Cir. 1986)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 288.
102. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).





108. Id. at 289–90 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 615–16
(1989)).
109. Id.
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a privacy interest.110 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals went on to
hold that a continuing privacy interest existing in containers of such bio-
logical samples is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning
concerning cell phones.111
The court affirmed the lower court’s holding that there is a Fourth
Amendment privacy interest in blood that has been taken for medical
purposes.112 That the State subsequently tested it and there were no ap-
plicable exceptions to the warrant requirement meant the State violated
Martinez’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an analysis of the
blood.113 The distinctions the court made here provide insight into how
courts and practitioners should analyze the facts surrounding voluntari-
ness and abandonment in a Fourth Amendment context.
Because of recent developments in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
it is worth following up on a case, Hankston v. State,114 discussed in a
prior Survey period.115 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had decided
that Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution, like the Fourth
Amendment, does not recognize a privacy interest in call logs or CSLI
data.116 Since then, Carpenter has been decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court and Hankston was remanded to the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals.117 Acknowledging Carpenter, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
granted Hankston’s Fourth Amendment ground, dismissed the Article I,
Section 9 ground without prejudice, vacated the lower court’s judgment,
and remanded the case to be reexamined based on Carpenter.118
B. PROBABLE CAUSE
Under the United States and Texas constitutions, probable cause is the
standard that the State must satisfy in order to obtain a warrant for a
search or arrest.119 Unless an exception to the warrant requirement ap-
plies, a warrant must be obtained for a valid search or arrest. Probable
cause “exists when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within
the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable
prudence to believe that the instrumentality of a crime or evidence per-
taining to a crime will be found.”120
In Hyland v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed
whether, after a Franks hearing121 is conducted and any recklessly false
110. Id. at 290 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617).
111. Id.; see Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395–96 (2014).
112. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 292.
113. See id.
114. 582 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (per curiam).
115. Benjamin S. Brown & The Honorable Michael E. Keasler, Criminal Procedure:
Confessions, Searches, and Seizures, 4 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 141, 146 (2018).
116. Hankston v. State, 517 S.W.3d 112, 121–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
117. Hankston v. Texas, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018).
118. Hankston, 582 S.W.3d at 280.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
120. Washington v. State, 660 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc).
121. See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978).
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statements are removed from the search warrant, a heightened probable
cause standard existed.122 Richard Hyland was involved in a motorcycle
accident that killed his wife. An officer obtained a search warrant for
Hyland’s blood using a pre-printed affidavit form where the officer filled
in details. The blood was drawn, and an analysis found that Hyland was
intoxicated at the time of the accident. Hyland was convicted of intoxica-
tion manslaughter.
During the trial stage of the proceeding, the trial judge conducted a
Franks hearing due to Hyland’s claim that the search warrant was issued
based on false statements in the affidavit.123 Hyland focused on
paragraphs seven and nine of the affidavit, which were pre-printed
paragraphs that had no alterations by the officer. Paragraph seven stated
that the officer requested field sobriety tests to be done by Hyland and
that the results were attached. Paragraph nine stated that the officer had
seen intoxicated persons previously and based on that, his experience and
training, and the rest of the facts offered, the officer placed Hyland under
arrest for DWI and requested a breath and/or blood sample that Hyland
refused to provide. Hyland argued neither of those paragraphs could be
true since Hyland was unconscious. The trial judge excised paragraph
seven and part of paragraph nine. 124 Then, the trial judge reviewed what
remained in the affidavit and found it supported a finding of probable
cause. 125 The court of appeals reversed the trial judge and Hyland’s con-
viction. The court of appeals held that, after the Franks hearing, what
remained of the search warrant affidavit did not support a finding of
probable cause to take Hyland’s blood.126
The State argued before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that the
word “clearly” in McClintock was not meant to show that a higher proba-
ble cause standard existed after a Franks hearing.127 The court agreed.128
It stated that the purpose of “clearly” was to express “that a reviewing
court must ensure that whatever remains in the purged affidavit is still
enough to establish probable cause.”129 The court then turned to distin-
guishing this case from other cases with similarities.130 Finally, the court
found that probable cause did exist based on facts stating that: (1) there
was a strong odor of alcohol on Hyland; (2) the circumstances of the
crash indicated that Hyland was the driver; and (3) serious injuries re-
sulted from the crash.131 The court of criminal appeals reversed the hold-
ing of the court of appeals.132
122. Hyland v. State, 574 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
123. Id. at 909.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 909–10.
126. Id. at 910 (citing McClintock v. State, 444 S.W.3d 15, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 913.
130. Id. at 915.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 916.
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In State v. Martinez, a motion to suppress was filed by Roger Anthony
Martinez concerning the legality of his arrest for public intoxication.133
The trial judge and court of appeals agreed with Martinez.134 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals addressed whether the collective-knowledge
doctrine applied to the warrantless arrest of Martinez.135
It was undisputed that Martinez was arrested without a warrant. The
State argued that Article 14.01(b) applied and allowed for such an ar-
rest.136 The trial judge and court of appeals found a lack of direct evi-
dence that the arresting officer, Officer Quinn, had observed Martinez’s
intoxication.137 The State argued that the collective-knowledge doctrine
should apply and that the knowledge of Officers Guerrero and Ramirez,
who testified that they observed Martinez’s intoxication, should be added
to the knowledge of the arresting officer, Quinn. The court relied on
Woodward v. State, holding that when several officers are cooperating,
their cumulative information may be considered in determining probable
cause.138 Martinez argued that communication between the officers is a
key part of the collective-knowledge doctrine that needed to be satisfied.
The State argued that communication is only a way to prove cooperation
between officers, and that cooperation itself is “the true cornerstone of
the doctrine.”139 Martinez warned against adopting this rationale as en-
dorsing a “hive thinking” approach.140 The court acknowledged Marti-
nez’s concerns, but found that due to the facts of this specific case—that
all officers responded to the same call, were present at the scene, commu-
nicated with Martinez, and were present at the arrest—the collective-
knowledge doctrine applied.141 It was undisputed that Officers Guerrero
and Ramirez had probable cause to arrest Martinez, and the court’s re-
view of the facts supported such a belief.142 The matter was reversed and
remanded to the lower court.143 Here, it was the type and amount of co-
operation that resulted in the collective-knowledge doctrine being appli-
cable.144 The court did not establish the outer limit on when cooperation
is enough to apply the collective-knowledge doctrine, but an effort to de-
termine such a limit will likely be made by practitioners in the courts.
C. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is ordinarily required to con-
133. State v. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 626.
136. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b).
137. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d at 625.
138. See Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
139. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d at 627.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 627–28.
143. Id. at 630.
144. See id. at 627.
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duct a legally permissible search or seizure of an individual.145 It follows
that a warrantless search or seizure is a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment unless an exception to the rule applies.146 One such exception is
exigent circumstances.147 This applies “when the exigencies of the situa-
tion make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment” in order
to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.148 Another exception is
when consent is given by the individual subject to the search.149 When the
State relies on consent as its justification, it must prove that the consent
was “freely and voluntarily given.”150 “Voluntariness depends on the to-
tality of the circumstances.”151 Whether the individual’s will has been
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired af-
fect such a determination.152 Additionally, when a search or seizure is
done by a private party, no Fourth Amendment violation occurs, and the
State is allowed to use the evidence if lawfully acquired—but there may
be a statutory remedy available for the individual subjected to that
search.153
1. Exigent Circumstances
In Mitchell v. Wisconsin, Gerald Mitchell was arrested for driving a
vehicle while intoxicated.154 A preliminary breath test found that Mitch-
ell’s blood alcohol concentration was triple the legal limit for driving in
Wisconsin. The arresting officer then drove Mitchell to the police station
to use the more reliable breath test equipment there. Upon arrival,
Mitchell was too lethargic to complete the breath test. The officer chose
to drive Mitchell to a nearby hospital for a blood test. At the hospital,
Mitchell was unconscious, but his blood was drawn anyway. The blood
test found Mitchell’s BAC to be above the legal limit. Mitchell filed a
motion to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that it violated
his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches since it was
done without a warrant. The State argued that the search was valid under
the theory of implied consent based on Wisconsin state law, which
presumes that a person incapable of withdrawing implied consent to BAC
testing has not done so. The trial judge denied the motion.155 The Wis-
consin Supreme Court affirmed the lawfulness of the blood draw.156
145. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
146. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
147. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148–49 (2013).
148. Id.
149. See Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
150. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
151. State v. Ruiz, 581 S.W.3d 782, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233 (1973)).
152. Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citations omitted).
153. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d
543, 547–48 (2019).
154. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2532 (2019) (plurality opinion).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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Sidestepping the issue of implied consent, the U.S. Supreme Court
found that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath
test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally allows for a blood test
without a warrant.157 The exigent-circumstances doctrine requires that
there be a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a
warrant.”158 The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held that the dis-
sipation of BAC alone is not enough to allow for the exigency exception
to apply.159 Justice Alito, with whom three justices joined, relied on
Schmerber v. California160 to assert that an exigency exists when “(1)
BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing
health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a
warrant application.”161 Justice Alito stated that both conditions are met
when a suspected drunk driver is unconscious.162 Justice Thomas, who
concurred in the judgment only, would have applied a per se rule that the
natural dissipation of BAC itself creates a sufficient exigency to allow for
a warrantless blood draw.163 The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and
remanded.164
State v. Garcia165 was decided during the current Survey period, De-
cember 12, 2018, but has been discussed in the immediately preceding
SMU Annual Texas Survey.166 For that reason it will only briefly be men-
tioned here. Garcia is a case concerning the exigent circumstances excep-
tion to the warrant requirement.167 Officers suspected Garcia was
intoxicated and were concerned that he might soon receive a medical
treatment that could destroy evidence of intoxication, so a sample of Gar-
cia’s blood was taken without a warrant. Garcia filed a motion to sup-
press which was granted by the trial judge. The court of appeals
reversed.168 On discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals’ ruling turned on the trial judge’s findings of historical fact and the
amount of deference those findings are entitled to if supported by the
record.169 Under that reasoning, the court reversed the court of appeals
and found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in his ruling.170
The court rejected a per se rule that any time a person suspected of com-
mitting a drunk-driving offense is taken to a hospital, exigent circum-
157. Id. at 2537.
158. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013) (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 509 (1978)).
159. Id. at 152–53.
160. 384 U.S. 757 (2019).
161. Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537.
162. Id.; but see Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2543–44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 2539 (Thomas, J., concurring).
164. Id. (plurality opinion).
165. 569 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
166. Elizabeth G. Rozacky & The Honorable Michael E. Keasler, Criminal Procedure:
Confessions, Searches, and Seizures, 5 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 115, 127 (2019).
167. Garcia, 569 S.W.3d at 145.
168. Id. at 147.
169. Id. at 157.
170. Id. at 144, 157.
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stances exist for a warrantless search.171 However, the court left open the
possibility that “if an officer is actually aware of facts from which an ob-
jectively reasonable officer could conclude that an evidence-destroying
medical treatment is imminent, the Fourth Amendment allows the officer
to take any reasonable steps to preserve the integrity of the imperiled
evidence.”172
2. Implied Consent
The unaddressed issue in Mitchell, implied consent as an exception to
the warrant requirement, found its way back to the forefront of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, this time before the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, in State v. Ruiz.173 Jose Ruiz was charged with driving while
intoxicated after the State drew his blood while he was unconscious and
tested it without a warrant. Ruiz filed a motion to suppress, the trial judge
granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was presented with the issue of
whether implied consent is a valid exception to warrant requirement for a
blood draw in these circumstances.174 The State argued that Ruiz gave his
implied consent to alcohol-related testing “when he drove on Texas road-
ways, and because that consent was never limited, withdrawn, or revoked,
his consent remained in full effect at the time of the blood draw.”175 As
stated previously, voluntariness is a key component of consent that the
State must prove.176 The State argued, under Fienen v. State, that the fact
that Ruiz was unconscious should not be held against the State because
Ruiz’s medical condition was not caused by the State.177 The court re-
jected this argument because Fienen relied on Schneckloth, which re-
quires the totality of the circumstances evaluation to consider “the
characteristics of the accused” as well.178 The court found Ruiz’s uncon-
sciousness to be a characteristic that must be considered, and stressed
that it rendered Ruiz unable to make choice one way or the other.179
Thus, the theory of implied consent did not operate as a valid exception
to the warrant requirement.180 However, the court left open the possibil-
ity that the reasoning offered in Mitchell may be applicable here and re-
manded to the lower court to consider exigent circumstances.181
171. Id. at 159.
172. Id. at 155.
173. 581 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
174. Id. at 784.
175. Id. at 785; see TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 724.011, 724.014.
176. Ruiz, 581 S.W.3d at 786 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 291 U.S. 543, 548
(1968)).
177. Id. (citing Fienen v. State, 390 S.W.3d, 328, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).
178. Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
179. Id. at 786–87.
180. Id. at 787.
181. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2525 (2019)).
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3. Private-Party Search Doctrine
In State v. Ruiz, students reported to school officials that a substitute
teacher, Lauro Eduardo Ruiz, was taking photos underneath students’
skirts with his cell phone.182 “The dean and vice principal summoned
[Ruiz] to the office and questioned him about the allegations.”183 Ruiz
began fidgeting with his phone during the questioning, so Ruiz was asked
to place his phone on the desk. Ruiz complied. Principal Saenz eventually
joined the meeting, and Ruiz admitted he “had a problem.”184 Saenz
viewed photos on Ruiz’s phone and saw images of girls’ legs in their
school uniforms. Saenz allowed Ruiz to retrieve some information off his
phone and then placed it in an envelope to give to the police. The police
obtained search warrants for the phone and “found incriminating images
taken from underneath students’ skirts.”185 Ruiz filed a motion to sup-
press the evidence from his phone arguing that Saenz’s warrantless search
of the phone violated the Fourth Amendment and should be suppressed
under Article 38.23.186 The trial judge granted the motion.187 The court of
appeals reversed the trial judge’s decision, stating that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to private individuals and Ruiz did not prove
Saenz violated any law in searching and seizing the phone.188
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment and Article 38.23 to the facts.189 The court rejected
Ruiz’s argument because “(1) the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
the actions of private individuals”; (2) Article 38.23 was inapplicable
under these facts; and (3) Miles’s holding does not support Ruiz’s
claim.190
The court reiterated that the Fourth Amendment is only a restraint on
government.191 The court then acknowledged that Article 38.23(a) does
include an “other person” provision regarding who may obtain evidence,
but stated that it is limited by requiring that the other person obtain the
evidence by violating either the constitutions or laws of the United States
or Texas.192 The court recognized that its opinion in Miles could create
confusion as to whether a private individual can violate the Constitution
and clarified that to the extent that Miles supported that theory, it was
unnecessary to the holding in Miles.193 The court explained that the hold-




186. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23.
187. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d at 545.
188. Id. (citations omitted).
189. Id. at 545–46; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23; Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d
28, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
190. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d at 546.
191. Id. (citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)); see also Gillett v. State,
588 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
192. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d at 546.
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ing in Miles relied on violations of criminal laws by private individuals,
not violations of the Constitution.194
Lastly, Ruiz argued that Saenz violated Section 33.02(a), so the re-
quirements of Article 38.23(a) were still not met.195 The court found that
the trial judge determined that Saenz accessed Ruiz’s phone without his
consent, but that no finding regarding Saenz’s intent was made, and the
evidence showed that the phone was looked through for the purpose of
handing it to the police.196 Therefore, the statutory defense in Section
33.02(e) had not been overcome.197 Accordingly, Ruiz failed to meet his
burden of showing that a statutory violation occurred.198 Because none of
Ruiz’s arguments were applicable the court of appeals’ judgment was
affirmed.199
IV. CONCLUSION
The most notable cases during this Survey period were Sims, Ruiz, and
Martinez.200 In Sims, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals used Carpen-
ter as a guide to further develop the law regarding police use of CSLI
data. Sims provided a framework that expands the protections afforded
by the Fourth Amendment, and the lower courts in Texas can now look to
Sims for guidance when determining whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy has been violated concerning CSLI data. That framework also
allows the lower courts a fair amount of flexibility based on its case-by-
case approach. In Ruiz, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed
the issue the U.S. Supreme Court side-stepped in Mitchell and has helped
provide additional guidance for the lower courts on how the factors of an
implied-consent analysis should be considered. In Martinez, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals found that cooperation supported the applica-
tion of the collective-knowledge doctrine but rejected that a “hive think-
ing” approach was endorsed. The amount of cooperation necessary for
the application of the collective-knowledge doctrine will be important for
the courts to determine. Undoubtedly, these will be areas of the law
worth monitoring as the lower courts begin analyzing unique scenarios.
194. Id.
195. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02(e).
196. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d at 548.
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